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ABSTRACT 
 
This chapter explores how lay publics respond to potential disasters. It con-
tends that the current risk perception field largely neglects the common-sense be-
liefs and emotions that lie at the root of public responses to risks. The chapter 
challenges several of the assumptions that buttress the conventional construal of 
the terms ‘risk’ and ‘perception’. It proposes that the current focus on how the in-
dividual mind cognitively processes predictable, calculable phenomena should be 
replaced by emphasis on how emotional and socio-cultural beings represent often 
unknowable potential catastrophes. Social representations theory is put forward as 
a viable theoretical framework within which this shift could be achieved. The 
chapter illustrates the value of a social representations approach to studying risk 
by presenting the findings of a cross-cultural study examining social representa-
tions of earthquakes in cities at risk of earthquakes in the US, Japan and Turkey. 
The chapter concludes by proposing routes by which the findings of such studies 
could be channelled into behavioural intervention programmes. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter examines how members of the public represent potential catastro-
phes, from earthquakes to pandemics. It offers a challenge to the ‘risk perception’ 
research agenda as well as to the conventional construal of both of the terms ‘risk’ 
and ‘perception’, en route to proposing core emotional and socio-cultural drivers 
that shape how people face the dangers and catastrophes of the future. In doing so, 
it complements and extends existing work on how people think, feel and act in re-
lation to the host of dangers that they face. 
 
Challenging the term ‘risk’  
 
The contemporary definition of risk used by experts relates to predicting the 
“probability of an event, combined with the magnitude of losses and gains that it 
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will entail” (Douglas, 1992, p. 40). In the safety sphere the ‘gains’ element tends 
to drop away and ‘risk’ represents the risk of death, but also the risk of disfigure-
ment or disability. Thus, regarding the perils of the future, risk can simply be de-
fined as the probability that a harmful event will occur (Weinstein, 2003). 
 
The emphasis on probability calculation demonstrates that this understanding 
of risk represents a very different orientation to peril from that which existed in 
pre-modern times (Bernstein, 1998). In the anthropologist Mary Douglas’ ac-
counts of pre-modern societies, risk simply means ‘danger from future damage’, 
with a community’s construal of the dangers they face intimately linked to local 
cultural operations of morality, responsibility attribution and intergroup bounda-
ries (Douglas, 1992; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). In contrast, contemporary us-
age of the term ‘risk’ implies precision of calculation, objectivity and control 
(Joffe, 1999). Viewing dangers in terms of causal, predictable relations is a dis-
tinctively modern phenomenon, swathing dangers in an aura of scientific meas-
urement and control (Bernstein, 1998; Douglas, 1992).  
 
Undoubtedly, modern scientific and technological advances have indeed in-
creased the extent to which human society can control many dangers. A host of 
the diseases that blighted previous eras, for example, have been rendered harmless 
due to use of antibiotics and vaccination programmes. However, a key dimension 
of risk in contemporary society is that the very interventions implemented to man-
age risks can set off unknowable chain reactions that generate further perils that 
elude human control. The emergence of new antibiotic-resistant strains of bacteria 
due to antibiotic overuse is a case in point. This observation buttresses the conten-
tion of sociologist Ulrich Beck (1992; 2006) that the sense of control over perils 
that is implied by the contemporary construal of ‘risk’ is largely illusory and 
ironic. Beck terms our late modern society ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992), or more 
latterly ‘world risk society’ (Beck, 2006), a phrase that “describes a phase of de-
velopment of modern society in which the social, political, ecological and individ-
ual risks created by the momentum of innovation increasingly elude the control 
and protective institutions of industrial society” (Beck, 1996, p. 27).  
 
Beck postulates that contemporary society is characterised by a profusion of 
fundamentally incalculable risks and that within the risk society, highly developed 
institutions (most notably science) try to anticipate what cannot be anticipated. 
Beck illustrates this irony with the following example: “when suicide terrorists 
succeeded in turning commercial passenger aircraft into rockets, which destroyed 
symbols of American world power” this was “an action that was utterly improb-
able according to every logic of risk” (Beck, 2006, p. 330). The irony here, in 
terms of the science of predicting risk, is that past experience encouraged anticipa-
tion of the wrong type of risk: before September 11, 2001, the World Trade Centre 
had been the target of a terrorist truck bomb, making camera surveillance wide-
spread, but not regarding a potential air attack. This instance of relying on histori-
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cal risk patterns to foretell those of the future stands as a sobering example for 
those working within the field. 
 
A more recent manifestation of the unpredictable nature of danger lay in the 
unanticipated outbreak of widespread Swine Influenza (H1N1) between the sum-
mer of 2009 and autumn of 2010, which arose in place of a predicted Highly 
Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) pandemic. One might argue that the World 
Health Organisation’s (WHO) declaration of (what turned out to be) a relatively 
mild bout of Swine Influenza as a pandemic owed more to its historical links with 
the 1918 ‘Spanish Flu’ (which may have contained strains of the same H1N1 vi-
rus) and the anticipation of severe strains of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza 
than to the outbreak itself. Extensive preparations had been made for HPAI, in-
cluding efforts by the WHO and UNICEF to devise programmes for drug and vac-
cine supply as well as public education and engagement activities (Scoones & 
Foster, 2010). These plans were quickly adopted as the basis for managing the un-
expected H1N1 outbreak, with the result that the major international effort to pro-
duce and distribute anti-retrovirals and vaccinations was directed at a more severe 
level of risk than that which arose. The science of predicting risk can therefore 
prove an unreliable guide for risk management decisions, causing scientific and 
financial resources to be channelled into activities that are wide of the mark.  
 
A final example of past experience encouraging anticipation of the wrong type 
of risk relates to the devastation that followed the March 2011 earthquake and tsu-
nami in Tōhoku, Japan. For economic reasons, most countries choose not to pro-
duce building codes and structures that anticipate the most extreme seismic sce-
narios (and consequently are most costly). Rather, authorities determine the levels 
of structural resilience that buildings must conform to based on what are consid-
ered to be the most likely upper limits of future earthquakes and tsunami. These 
calculations are made on the basis of the seismic history of the area. On the basis 
of probabilistic assessments of the hazard in each location, which take into ac-
count earthquake magnitude over previous centuries, engineers had prepared 
structures (in terms of building codes and coastal defences) to withstand earth-
quakes of a magnitude between 7 and 8 (see Nishikawa, 2011), and their equiva-
lent tsunami. Disastrously, the earthquake that hit Tōhoku on March 11, 2011 
measured magnitude 9 and, together with its incipient tsunami, destroyed villages, 
damaged several nuclear reactors and caused the deaths of approximately 16,000 
people, with a further 3,000 recorded as missing (World Health Organisation, 
2012). Preparing solely for the statistically probable can therefore produce catas-
trophic results.  
 
These three examples indicate that far from being foreseeable and calculable 
phenomena, many future dangers are unknown and unknowable. Complex, long 
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return period1, spatially variable dangers - ranging from earthquakes to pandemics 
to climate change - often cannot be accurately predicted. Those prediction efforts 
that are nevertheless mounted may not produce very useful information: subject to 
numerous sources of error and variation, they are at best merely “pieces of an in-
tricate puzzle that may sometimes contribute to improved decisions” (Sarewitz, 
2010, p. 24). The gradual devaluation of prediction is vividly illustrated in the his-
torical evolution of the field of seismology, which has (rather uniquely among sci-
entific fields) decisively shifted its focus away from prediction towards building 
resilience in the face of vulnerability (Hough, 2010; Sarewitz, 2010). Indeed, 
earthquake prediction is now a stigmatised pursuit among seismologists (Joffe, 
Rossetto, Bradley & O’Connor, submitted). Sarewitz (2010) states that the climate 
change area should, similarly, aspire to decreasing people’s vulnerability rather 
than to prediction, if the catastrophe is to be allayed. Thus, the validity and even 
desirability of treating risks as predictable, calculable phenomena is challenged by 
researchers, practitioners and theorists in certain fields. 
 
Challenging the term risk ‘perception’ 
 
Beck’s risk society theory effectively critiques the often inflated confidence of 
scientific fields in their powers of calculability. Once ‘risks’ are reframed as partly 
unknowable dangers or perils, rather than predictable, calculable entities, this 
chapter argues that we need a better model of what members of the public do with 
the unknowable than we currently see in the ‘risk perception’ field. The term ‘per-
ception’ generally pertains to sensorial knowledge – how one’s senses register a 
particular entity. Since the 1950s, the study of risk perception has been dominated 
by the field of cognitive psychology, which generally approaches risk perception 
as a form of ‘information processing’, focusing on the internal cognitive processes 
that occur when laypeople are confronted with risk.  
 
In recent times, the validity of conceptualising risk perception solely in terms 
of individual cognition has been questioned. One particularly salient basis for cri-
tique argues that treating responses to risk as mechanical information-processing 
that occurs within the individual mind obscures the inter-subjective aspects of 
knowledge (Joffe, 2003). People do not navigate the world as atomised individu-
als, but rather are embedded in social groups, cultures and societies. When con-
fronted with risks, people draw on the meaning systems and ways of thinking as-
sociated with the groups to which they belong; responses to risks develop in and 
through interaction with other social actors (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith & Braman, 
2010; Joffe, 2003). In contemporary society, risks are generally ‘perceived’ not 
via direct sensory information, but via media reports heralding news of an immi-
nent danger. Such reports often relay scientifically-generated information in a 
                                                          
1 The term ‘return period’ refers to the average intervals of time between haz-
ard events such as floods or earthquakes. 
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more populist form, for example, sensationalised media coverage of emerging in-
fectious diseases (Joffe & Haarhoff, 2002; Washer, 2004; 2006; Washer & Joffe, 
2006; Washer, Joffe & Solberg, 2008). The formation of ‘risk perception’ does not 
involve independent observation of stable external objects, but rather handling an 
intricate mix of visual and textual information that is communicated by a host of 
other social agents and institutions. Thus, what is termed ‘perception’ is a complex 
process involving engagement with sets of images and words that circulate in so-
ciety and that may re-iterate and re-interpret ‘official’ risk information. Focusing 
one’s lens purely on the individual mind means that the constitutive influence of 
such social phenomena remains unexplored. 
 
A further area that remains largely untapped by conventional understandings of 
risk perception relates to the emotional dimension of responses to risk (for excep-
tions see Lerner, Gonzalez, Small & Fischhoff, 2003; Peters, Burraston & Mertz, 
2004; Sjoberg, 2007). Risk perception is often characterised as defined by rather 
‘cold’ cognitive variables, such as estimated likelihood of being affected by the 
threat, perceived efficacy in relation to it and perceived severity of the risk.  While 
research on such variables has undoubtedly furnished useful results, an exclusive 
focus on the pathways of rational thought involved in risk responses is misguided. 
A refrain throughout this chapter will be that rather than the more rational, cogni-
tive processes currently given prominence, a more emotive dimension lies at the 
core of the response to danger. This is not to say that the former is not involved: 
dual-process theories suggest that ‘thought’ might comprise both a rapid, emo-
tional dimension and a stream devoted to slower, more deliberative cognitive 
processing (Epstein, 1994). In recent times, dual-process theories have increas-
ingly found voice in the work of psychologists working on risk perception, who 
conceive of responses to potential dangers as operating along rapid ‘feeling’ and 
slower ‘analysis’ dimensions (Slovic, Finucane, Peters & MacGregor, 2004; 
Slovic & Peters, 2006). Key theorists of the ‘risk perception’ model are now re-
dressing the relegation of emotion in giving primacy to ‘the feeling of risk’, as is 
the title of Slovic’s (2010) more recent anthology, in contrast to his earlier ‘The 
perception of risk’ (2000). However, it must be noted that the ‘risk as feeling’ 
trend within the psychology of risk perception devolves largely around ‘affect’, 
which Slovic et al. (2005) define as a ‘faint whisper of emotion’ (p.353) demarcat-
ing the goodness of badness of a stimulus. Affect is experienced as a feeling, ei-
ther consciously or non-consciously and demarcates a positive or negative aspect 
of the stimulus. Slovic et al. state that the more ‘visceral emotion of fear’ that 
people may experience regarding the potential danger is not what is being referred 
to. Much of Leiserowitz’s work (e.g. Leiserowitz, 2006; Smith & Leiserowitz, 
2012) on perceptions of climate change affect typifies this trend.  In addition, the 
psychology that finds its way into other fields and applied contexts often remains 
mired in older models of risk perception with their highly cognitivist, rational fo-
cus on probability assessment. 
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A further difficulty with the way in which risk perception research has been 
pursued lies in the somewhat dismissive orientation it adopts to lay knowledge. 
Much risk ‘perception’ research could more accurately be characterised as re-
search on risk ‘misperception’. The risk perception research agenda often invokes 
the notion of a fundamental division between the knowledge held by experts, 
which is assumed to be objective, correct and authoritative, and that held by lay-
people, which is subjective, irrational and often erroneous. Scientific evaluations 
of risks, from food scares to climate change to natural disasters, are rarely wholly 
unanimous or immutable; Beck (2006) contends that it is scientists whose “find-
ings often contradict each other, who change their minds so fundamentally that 
what was judged ‘safe’ to swallow today, may be a ‘cancer risk’ in two years’ 
time.” (p. 345). Indeed, fallibility is a cornerstone of scientific method and phi-
losophy. Despite this, it is laypeople whose (mis)judgements and biases are em-
phasised, with deviations between lay beliefs and current expert consensus in-
variably attributed to errors on the part of the lay thinker. In particular, the risk 
perception field examines the numerical probabilities people offer in estimating 
their chances of being affected by a particular risk. These are then compared to 
scientific estimates to identify how the public distort risk information, typified in 
the frequent laments about the public’s amplification of certain hazards that ex-
perts deem low-risk such as air travel, and underestimation of those, including car 
travel, which they ‘should’ rate as high risk. 
 
The focus of the risk perception field on perceptual and cognitive error in ap-
prehending expert-defined risks often implicitly endorses a ‘deficit model’ of pub-
lic responses to scientific information. The deficit model approach to lay knowl-
edge assumes that the public are ignorant of scientific ‘facts’ and seeks to rectify 
what is seen as an information- or knowledge-gap between science and its lay re-
cipients (Hilgartner, 1990). Deficit model approaches have been criticised both for 
reifying expert perspectives as objective truth and for propagating a view of a sin-
gle, context-independent rationality, thereby precluding recognition of alternative 
forms of rationality that operate within local contexts. For example, Graham’s 
(1993) study of attitudes to smoking risk among socio-economically disadvan-
taged single mothers showed that women were aware of smoking’s health risks, 
but consciously judged that these were outweighed by the benefits they derived 
from smoking, in providing a form of stress relief in harsh social circumstances. 
Risk evaluations that deviate from expert advice are therefore not necessarily irra-
tional or uninformed, but rather can reflect the contingencies people live with. 
Within theorisation of science’s role in society, the deficit model has now fallen 
from favour, with a focus on public ‘understanding’ of science shifting to public 
‘engagement’ with science (Bauer, 2009). The shift to public engagement with 
science leaves open alternative ways of theorising public responses to risk, which 
do not privilege one particular form of thinking and that examine the texture and 
consequences of lay thought without an agenda of judging whether it is ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’.  
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Evidence for ‘risk perception’ driving action? 
 
A key ambition of those who use risk perception research in applied contexts is 
the development of effective means of predicting (and, it is hoped, thereby under-
standing and changing) people’s risk-related behaviour. Thus a question arises 
concerning its explanatory power in the area of behaviour: are people’s danger-
related behaviours driven by the cognitive components of responses to danger, or 
by other elements that are based in the emotional and socio-cultural experience of 
risk?  
 
Efforts to change people’s risk behaviour have traditionally relied on ‘public 
education’ campaigns, assuming that if people are aware of a risk and know what 
to do, they are likely to act accordingly. This assumption is rooted in the rational-
ist philosophy that has dominated the psychology of risk since the mid-twentieth 
century, typified in the names of prominent models of the thought-action relation-
ship such as the ‘Theory of Reasoned Action’ and ‘Theory of Planned Behaviour’ 
(Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). The limits of rationalist understandings of 
risk-related behaviour have gradually become evident (see Joffe, 1996). In the 
area of adjusting to earthquake threat, for example, research generally concludes 
that awareness of earthquake risk and some of the variables contained in the cog-
nitive models are only weakly related to undertaking protective behaviour (Sol-
berg, Rossetto & Joffe, 2010). Solberg et al.’s (2010) review highlights the impor-
tance of factors with emotional and/or socio-cultural foundations, such as trust, 
social identity, attributions of responsibility and fatalism in informing earthquake 
preparedness. Extensive research in the area of emerging infectious diseases has 
also corroborated the importance of trust and the emotional experience of worry in 
influencing the actions people take to reduce their risk of infection (Bish & Mi-
chie, 2010; Rubin, Potts & Michie, 2010). Buttressed by such findings, recogni-
tion of the limits of purely cognitive approaches appears to be dissipating further 
into the risk perception field: Twenty-five years after research began on the notion 
of ‘optimistic bias’ (Weinstein, 1978), a ‘cognitive distortion’ whereby people see 
themselves as less vulnerable to dangers than their peers, the psychologist who 
pioneered the concept has begun to change his take on what drives behaviour, 
shifting from the purely cognitive to the more emotive realm: “considerable evi-
dence exists demonstrating that worry (a poorly defined concept containing ele-
ments of both emotion and attention) […] provides predictive power beyond that 
provided by judgements of likelihood and severity” (Weinstein, 2003, p. 48). In-
deed, the very phenomenon of optimistic bias may be fundamentally emotionally 
driven, reflecting a defensive response to fear rather than ‘cold’ cognitive error 
(Joffe, 1999). 
 
Thus, it seems that faulty judgements are not the key or sole predictors of peo-
ple’s responses to risks. With an understanding of ‘risk’ as ‘potential danger’ 
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(Douglas, 1992), or as Beck (2006) puts it, ‘anticipated catastrophe’, what comes 
to the fore is emotion in relation to threat. Theorists such as Beck suggest that 
from a technical perspective, part of the work of modernity is to set in motion 
mechanisms to control the incalculable and unknowable - from vaccination to 
early detection systems, from retrofitting to the science of risk perception. This 
machinery of control does not always function as intended or desired, and humans 
must develop other means of managing the emotional challenges that arise in 
times of crisis.  
 
A more fitting theory of people’s apprehension of dangers: from ‘risk per-
ception’ to ‘risk representation’ 
 
When a focus on the accuracy of public ‘understandings’ or ‘perceptions’ of 
risks is replaced by a concern with public ‘engagement’ with potential dangers, re-
spect for local knowledge becomes central. This chapter posits a theory that takes 
as its subject the common-sense of local knowledge: social representations theory 
(SRT), a social psychological theory that examines lay uptake of societal phenom-
ena (Moscovici, 1961/ 2008). Social representations are widespread ‘ensembles of 
thoughts and feelings’ about a given phenomenon akin to a ‘lay theory’ or ‘lay ex-
planation’. This ‘ensemble of thoughts and feelings’ is expressed by individuals in 
their conversation, behaviour and internal understandings (Wagner et al., 1999) 
but underpinned by socio-cultural, historical and group-specific ideologies. Thus, 
with SRT the theoretical emphasis shifts from the individual mind as a processor 
of risk information to people and their ideas as products of their histories, social 
groups and cultures. Furthermore, the theory contends that people “generate repre-
sentations not so much by a reasoning or computing process as by a process of 
communicating” (Moscovici, 1984, p. 951). This is particularly relevant to repre-
sentations of risks such as earthquakes, climate change and flooding, which do not 
merely face individuals but neighbourhoods, communities and countries. Repre-
sentations of these phenomena are forged in the ongoing communication that oc-
curs between people, and a considerable portion of the representations of these 
threats is therefore socially shared. The aim of SRT is to document this shared 
portion of knowledge about particular phenomena. The foci thus become explora-
tion of the substantive content of what people say about threats (as opposed to, for 
example, numerical probability estimates) and examination of widespread, cultur-
ally-based representations of the threat (as opposed to individual-level variables). 
 
SRT holds that in the course of communication about a new risk, two processes 
occur: ‘anchoring’, by which existing ideas and concepts are imposed upon the 
new information, and ‘objectification’, where the new information is assimilated 
into people’s knowledge by means of familiar symbols, metaphors and images. 
For example, Japanese mythology represents earthquakes as a consequence of the 
movement of giant catfish (Namazu) who live underground (Yamori, this volume). 
Official Japanese earthquake information communications today continue to re-
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cruit images of catfish: despite the catfish explanation of earthquakes not being 
literally believed, the historical symbol has persisted and effortlessly connotes 
‘earthquake’ to Japanese people.  
 
An important facet of the application of social representations theory to study-
ing responses to risk relates to its incorporation of the emotive dimension of 
knowledge. For example, Höijer’s (2010) analysis of coverage of climate change 
in Swedish newspapers pinpoints the importance of the emotions of fear, hope, 
guilt, compassion and nostalgia in constituting the social representations that 
evolve.  Moscovici (1961/2008) suggests that social representations emerge in re-
sponse to a threat to a group’s identity or way of life, and that a central function of 
social representation is to defend against such threat by ‘making the unfamiliar 
familiar’. Psychological efforts to manage emotions like anxiety can therefore 
shape the representations of risk that evolve. For example, Joffe’s (1999) research 
documents how social representations of AIDS in the 1990s developed along a 
pattern of ‘not me, the other is to blame’, with a variety of different groups down-
grading their own vulnerability to HIV/AIDS and focusing on the inflated risk 
they attributed to dissimilar ‘others’, such as gay men or people from other coun-
tries. This tendency to distance the self from worrying phenomena by projecting 
risk onto ‘the other’ permeates responses to a wide variety of risks, including a 
range of infectious diseases (Joffe, 2011), climate change (Smith & Joffe, 2013) 
and earthquakes (Joffe et al., in press).  
 
A strength of the social representations framework as a theory of public en-
gagement lies in its ability to see different publics’ accounts of a given danger as 
forms of knowledge in their own right rather than as deficient forms of scientific 
knowledge (Duveen, 2008). SRT examines the contents of people’s risk-related 
thinking without reference to the ‘reality’ of the risk; the concern is not with the 
accuracy of the representation but with the meanings that people attach to a given 
risk and the consequences of these meanings for themselves, for others and for so-
ciety. These ‘common-sense’ notions are no less important than people’s more 
scientifically-informed knowledge in shaping their responses to the risks they en-
counter. On a practical note, this is an important consideration for policy makers 
seeking to understand how people’s danger-related thinking ‘works’ and might 
therefore be challenged and changed: focusing purely on the accuracy of people’s 
scientific knowledge means that other dimensions of their risk-related thought, 
feeling and behaviour remain undocumented. More naturalistic studies that focus 
on where people are rather than where they should be have clear advantages for 
developing interventions. As Fishbein and Cappella (2006, p. S4) state, “one must 
understand the behavior from the perspective of the population for whom the in-
terventions are being developed. Once understood this way, these beliefs can serve 
as the basis for messages and other interventions”. A further advantage that SRT 
offers for policy concerns relates to its concentration on the communicative as-
pects of social representations. It interrogates the role played by messages that cir-
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culate in the public sphere, particularly within the mass media, in shaping risk rep-
resentations (e.g. see Washer, Joffe & Solberg, 2008). Such analyses can indicate 
how change can be effected in threat-related behaviour through changes in the 
communications people encounter. 
 
To illustrate the usefulness of adopting a view of responses to risk as emotional 
and socio-cultural phenomena, this chapter introduces an empirical study of how 
people living in the cities of Seattle (USA), Izmir (Turkey) and Osaka (Japan) - all 
areas that are highly seismic but that have not recently been directly affected by 
damaging earthquakes - represent earthquakes.  
  
A new way of studying responses to earthquake risk: The EPICentre risk 
representation project 
 
Investigation of naturalistic representations of a given threat involves a depar-
ture from conventional psychological methods of experimentation and survey re-
search. Survey and experimental methods require that a researcher predefine the 
variables of interest, leaving little space for the emergence of findings that have 
not been anticipated. This is particularly problematic when there is a cultural gap 
between the researcher and participant, as the cross-cultural equivalence of con-
cepts cannot be assumed. Furthermore, surveys, in particular, tap only consciously 
available cognitions. If people’s risk-related ideas are informed by values, images 
and emotions that are not necessarily conscious, this material will not become 
visible in self-reported questionnaire responses. An additional issue relates to the 
extent to which the psychological response to risk can be captured using purely 
quantitative measures, or whether important facets of the texture of thought are 
lost when it is translated into a series of numbers. 
 
These concerns with the validity of conventional methods of investigating hu-
man responses to risk stimulated researchers working within UCL’s Earthquake 
and People Interaction Centre (EPICentre) to develop a new research technique, 
combining features of free-association with qualitative interview methodology 
(Joffe, 2011; Joffe & Elsey, under review). The method involves presenting par-
ticipants with an empty four-box grid and asking them to write or draw the first 
four words, feelings or images that come to mind when exposed to a certain 
prompt – in this case, the word ‘earthquake’. The researcher then conducts an in-
terview that is structured around these free-associations, asking the respondent to 
expand upon the associations they produced and asking follow-up questions to 
prompt the respondent to elaborate further. The interviewer avoids posing ques-
tions about areas or ideas that have not been spontaneously volunteered by the re-
spondent, thereby ensuring that the researcher’s preconceptions have minimal in-
fluence on the material gathered. This provides a greater degree of confidence that 
the data reflect the individual’s naturalistically-occurring thought patterns and tap 
the stored, automatic links made to the risk in question. Furthermore, free associa-
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tions reveal people’s most salient associations to the phenomenon, which Hollway 
& Jefferson (2000) suggest are primarily emotive. Thus the method provides an 
entry-point into the emotional substructure of people’s responses to risk. The in-
terviews are recorded, transcribed verbatim, and analysed using qualitative ana-
lytic procedures such as thematic analysis in order to identify any patterns in indi-
viduals’ responses to the risk. The data that emerge from this method are 
distinctive in the extent to which they reveal latent emotional and socio-cultural 
drivers of responses to risk.  
 
EPICentre’s project involved a cross-cultural application of this method to in-
terview demographically-matched samples of 48 individuals in each of three 
earthquake-prone cities – Seattle, Izmir and Osaka. The results of this study, pre-
sented in Joffe, Rossetto, Solberg and O’Connor (in press), contradict the conven-
tional assumption that action to reduce one’s risk results from perceiving a risk as 
likely and severe. Questionnaire data collected alongside the interviews (see Ros-
setto, Joffe & Solberg, 2011) indicated that despite universally high awareness of 
earthquake threat, participants in all three cities did little to prepare for earth-
quakes or mitigate their risk. Out of a list of nineteen risk-reducing actions, par-
ticipants in all locations reported having done (on average) less than half, though 
the Americans had adopted a significantly greater number of actions than either 
the Turkish or Japanese participants.  
 
Qualitative analysis of the interview data threw light on people’s failure to act 
to reduce their earthquake risk. Analysis indicated that important contributors to-
wards whether people acted or not lay in their emotional responses to earthquake 
threat. While the Japanese and particularly the Turkish respondents associated 
earthquakes with intense panic, fear and anxiety, American respondents displayed 
a much more moderate level of concern. Indeed, positive emotional responses to 
earthquakes were not uncommon in the US sample, with earthquakes provoking 
emotions such as awe, exhilaration and fascination. The Turkish interviews were 
also notable for the intensity of emotions related to anger, blame and distrust of 
state and construction authorities, whose negligence and corruption were posi-
tioned as the cause of earthquake damage. While US and Japanese participants 
distanced themselves from threat by favourably comparing themselves to other 
places that they saw as subject to a greater earthquake risk, Turkish participants 
sharply demurred from this pattern: they also compared themselves with other 
countries, but with the outcome of reinforcing their sense that they themselves 
were extremely vulnerable to earthquake damage.  
 
These emotional responses to earthquake threat interacted with a cluster of feel-
ings relating to a sense of agency and control in relation to earthquakes. Almost all 
participants demonstrated at some point in the interview that they were aware that 
actions were available by which they could reduce their risk from earthquakes. 
However, alongside this awareness lay strong trends towards fatalism in all three 
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cities, with respondents asserting that human action is pointless in the face of 
earthquake threat. These fatalistic tendencies were clearly culturally grounded and 
were rooted in different belief-systems in the three countries. US and Japanese fa-
talism largely followed from cultural representations of earthquakes as acts of na-
ture, which is a sphere immune from human influence. The fatalism present in the 
Turkish data, on the other hand, drew more on a religious framing of earthquakes 
as acts of divine power, as well as an emphasis on vulnerability caused by institu-
tional corruption.  
 
Framing the failure to act within the emotional and socio-cultural contexts re-
vealed in the interviews furnishes important insights into the risk experience of 
citizens of earthquake-prone cities. The data suggest that emotional and socio-
cultural variables exert an appreciable influence on people’s risk-relevant behav-
iour. The intense emotions experienced by the Turkish and Japanese participants, 
in combination with cultural currents that represented earthquakes as insurmount-
able forces, seem to have overwhelmed people and paralysed them from action. 
The US participants displayed a more muted emotional response to earthquakes 
and also reported the greatest levels of protective action. A more moderate level of 
concern, rather than high anxiety, may be more facilitative of earthquake-
protective behaviour. Nevertheless, even the US participants performed less than 
half of the recommended practices, with action possibly undermined by cultural 
representations of earthquake threat as impervious to human action.  
 
Concluding comments 
 
This chapter has polarised the more cognitive as opposed to the more emotive 
and cultural approaches to public engagement with risks. It has leant towards 
championing the latter since this rectifies an imbalance in the literature. However, 
the facets work in tandem. The method adopted in the EPICentre project provides 
the groundwork for establishing a valid model for risk-related thought, feeling and 
ultimately behaviour. Beyond its qualitative exploration of free associations, it 
also explored some of the more traditional variables found in ‘risk perception’ 
studies to gain a holistic picture of how people engaged with earthquake risk.  
 
When ‘risk perception’ is approached in this way, we see that the public’s as-
sessments of potential dangers do not differ from those of experts purely because 
they cannot do the sums. Rather, they care about different things: people’s repre-
sentations of risk are not solely based on evaluations of probability and severity, 
but incorporate a wide range of relevant information about the personal, commu-
nity and societal contexts in which the disaster would occur. Izmir’s residents’ 
failure to act is not a consequence of ignorance or inaccurate judgement, for ex-
ample, but of their representation of the structures they live in as badly built. High 
levels of structural vulnerability are represented as resulting from corruption in the 
building industry and among those who (fail to) regulate it. The sense of living in 
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unsafe structures undermines people’s self-efficacy as they feel that their actions 
will be pointless since their buildings are not correctly built to withstand earth-
quakes. Decision not to devote resources to such activities is understandable in 
this light. The shift from traditional ‘risk perception’ to ‘representations of poten-
tial catastrophes’ acknowledges the contextual and multi-faceted nature of lay 
knowledge, and examines it on its own terms without an agenda of determining 
whether it is deficient or adequate with reference to an ideal ‘expert’ position.  
 
This respectful orientation to lay knowledge provides a clear advantage when 
incorporating research into policy implementation or behaviour change pro-
grammes. Though methodologically convenient, squeezing lay experience into a 
form that it does not take naturalistically means that resultant policy initiatives 
draw on a contorted picture of ordinary thought and behaviour, leaving their im-
plementation vulnerable to unanticipated reactions. Since a social representations 
approach starts with where people are rather than where they ‘should’ be, thereby 
furnishing a valid and comprehensive depiction of lay experience, this map of the 
contours of social life can be used by policy initiatives to plan an implementation 
strategy that promotes public engagement and support. 
 
The EPICentre study provides a counter-balance to predominantly cognitive 
perspectives on risk perception. Social representations are highly dynamic: they 
are “networks of interacting concepts and images whose contents evolve continu-
ously over time and space” (Moscovici, 1988, p. 220). The concept of social rep-
resentation thus contains within it the propensity for change. SRT’s focus on the 
dependence of internal representation on the external socio-cultural environment 
brings to the fore the role played by the media and other societal messages in forg-
ing representations. SRT suggests that the interaction between these messages and 
individual minds will play a strong role in framing people’s behavioural choices. 
SRT studies can thereby indicate the types of messages that may encourage or un-
dermine taking action against various risks.  
 
Since SRT research shows that the network of concepts, images and associa-
tions that define a social representation are specific to certain groups, a one-size-
fits-all communication strategy is unlikely to impact upon different sectors of a 
society in the same way. For example, the health sphere has seen much interest in 
the effectiveness of campaigns that recruit emotional responses such as disgust 
(and indeed surprise, humour and fear) to bring about change in health-related be-
haviours. A key contingency in such campaigns is that different groups respond 
differently to these emotively-tinged messages; for example, one study found that 
disgust-inducing messages significantly increased the practice of hand-washing in 
men but not in women (Judah et al., 2009). The take-home message is that tailor-
ing risk messages to particular audiences is crucial. Such tailoring can only be 
achieved once the dynamics of each group’s representation of a particular danger 
are understood. 
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In terms of the broader context, contemporary societies appear to organise 
around a science of prediction, both in terms of predicting the dangers themselves 
and people’s responses to them. Yet prediction is at its least possible regarding po-
tential catastrophes. Unknowable risks hide behind a façade of calculability in the 
risk society (Beck, 2006). Stepping outside of the conventional conceptualisation 
of lay apprehension of potential danger as seen in mainstream risk perception re-
search brings emotion and contemporary cultural thinking centre-stage. It is these 
facets of the response to potential danger, alongside more cognitive aspects of risk 
perception, that need to be understood in order to tackle the obdurate problem of 
low levels of preparatory behaviours in the face of risks. 
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